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Preserving Objections To In Personam
Jurisdiction- Ohio's Persistent Shibboleth
J. Patrick Browne*

T

SCENARIO IS COMMONPLACE: Plaintiff causes summons to be
served on the defendant. The defendant believes the summons
is fatally defective, or the service is faulty, or that, for some reason
or another, the court in which the action is brought cannot lawfully
obtain jurisdiction over his person. Accordingly, he files a motion to
quash and set aside the summons, or a motion to dismiss for want
of in personam jurisdiction.
As so frequently happens, the court does not quite see the wisdom of defendant's position, and overrules the motion. Usually, the
court's journal entry will note that the defendant's "objections and
exceptions" to it's order "are noted and saved".
Must the defendant now reserve his objection to in personam
jurisdiction in all subsequent motions and pleadings filed in the
action?
Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Conventional Wisdom held that he must; that all motions and pleadings
thereafter filed had to be prefaced with some such magic phrase as:
"Now comes the defendant and, while not waiving his objection to
this court's jurisdiction over his person, and expressly reiterating
said objection as if it was fully rewritten herein, says .... 1
Whether or not the new Rules require such a reservation, it is
quite certain that the old Code of Civil Procedure never did require
it. That the Conventional Wisdom said that it had to be done (and
it did have to be done if one wanted to avoid a charge of malpractice)
is due solely to a judicial gloss put upon the Code by a faulty reading
of some early Supreme Court decisions.
The early text writers2 found no occasion that would call for
such a reservation. Bates is brief and dogmatic, simply saying that:
If defendant in such cases duly move to dismiss for want
of jurisdiction over him, his pleading to the merits after
overruling the motion does not cure the error nor waive his
rights.8
HE

*Asst. Prof. of Law, Cleveland State University, College of Law.
I See, eg., 2 0. JuR. 2d Appearance § 34 (1953); 1 W. GARDNER, GARDNER'S BATES
Interestingly enough, Professor Gardner
OHIO CIVIL PRACTICE 33 § 2.9 (1955).
neither cites authority for this proposition nor gives a form to be followed. Such a
form-more elaborate than the one given in the text-may be found at 2 AM. JUn.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE FORMS ANNOTATED 365-66, Form 16 (Rev. Ed. 1967).
2 1 S. NASH, PLEADING AND PRACTICE UNDER THE CODES OF OHIO, NEW YORK, KANSAS
AND NEBRASKA 89 (4th Ed 1874); 2 C. BATES, PLEADING, PARTIES AND FORMS UNDER
THE CODE 979 (1882); 1 A. YAPLE, CODE PRACTICE AND PRECEDENTS EMBRACING ALL
ACTIONS AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE CIVIL CODE OF OHIO 396 (1887).

8 2 C. BATES, supra, note 2. For authority Bates cites Dunn v. Hazlett, 4- Ohio St. 435
(1854). The fact pattern is classical: Plaintiff attempts to secure jurisdiction over

(Continued on next page)
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Since Yaple 4 is writing for the "young men of the Bar", he takes
greater pains in spelling out the appropriate procedure. If one wishes
to challenge the trial court's ruling with respect to jurisdiction, one
must do so through error proceedings. To preserve the question for
error proceedings, it is necessary to object to the ruling at the time
it is made. The proper way to make the objection is by taking an
exception. If the grounds for the objection appear in the court's
journal entry, the exception may be taken simply by noting it at
the end of the entry. If the grounds for the objection do not sufficiently appear in the journal entry, the party should prepare a bill
of exceptions and present it to the court for allowance. After the bill
of exceptions has been allowed, signed, and made part of the record,
the party may proceed in the case, and plead to the merits. Nothing
further is required. 5
That Yaple's instructions were correct is evidenced by the decision in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Collins, Admr.6 and, more
(Continued from preceding page)
an out-of-county defendant by alleging that he is jointly liable with an in-county

defendant. The out-of-county defendant raises the question of in personam jurisdiction
by filing a general denial. In Dunn, the trial court found no liability on the part of
the in-county defendant, and non-suited the plaintiff. Plaintiff asked for, and was
given, leave to file an amended declaration against the out-of-county defendant alone.
Dunn, the out-of-county defendant, moved to dismiss the amended declaration on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction over him. The motion was overruled, and
he filed a general denial, noting his objection in a bill of exceptions. After judgment
was taken against him, Dunn filed error proceedings in the Supreme Court. That
court reversed, saying:
It may be claimed, however, that Dunn waived any right he might
have by pleading to both the first and second declarations.
In all this we think the court erred, and this error was not cured by
either the plea to the first or second declarations; surely not by pleading
to the joint action, in which Dunn succeeded, and the error was committed
by the court before pleading to the second, both in allowing plaintiff to
proceed against Dunn alone, and in refusing to dismiss the suit, on the
motion of Dunn, for want of service on him in the county in which suit
was brought, we think that, after this last error was committed, Dunn
did not waive his rights by pleading to the merits.
4 1 A. YAPLE, supra, note 2.
Id. at 395-97 and 528-29. Yaple specifically recommends that the exception be taken
by a bill of exceptions, since, in most cases, affidavits or other evidence will be
required to establish the grounds for the objection, and these will not appear sufficiently in the court's journal entry. These instructions are premised on §§ 5297-5304 of
the Revised Statutes of Ohio, 1880. These actions of the Code of Civil Procedure
remained substantially the same from their original enactment in 1853 (51 LAWS OF
OHIo 57) until the amendment of 1935 (116 LAWS or OHIO 104) which eliminated
the need for an exception "whenever a matter has been called to the attention of
the court by objection, motion, or otherwise and the court has ruled thereon." This
latter amendment became § 11560 of the Ohio General Code, and later, § 2321.03 of
the Ohio Revised Code. The substance of the amendment has been carried over into
Rule 46 of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads:
An exception is not necessary, at any stage or step of the case or matter,
to lay a foundation for review whenever a matter has been called to the
attention of the court by objection, motion, or otherwise and the court has
ruled thereon.
s 11 Ohio C. Dec. 334- (Cir. Ct. 1900), aff'd without opinion sub moam. Collins v. Railroad, 63 Ohio St. 577, 60 N.E. 1129 (1900). Marsden v. Soper, 11 Ohio St. 503 (1860)
might also be cited for this proposition, though the point is not so clearly made.
At page 506 the Supreme Court noted:
(Continued on next page)
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clearly, by the decision in Foster v. Borne.7 Here the defendant moved
to quash the service of summons. The Court of Common Pleas sustained the motion, quashed the service, and dismissed the petition.
The Circuit Court, on petition in error for that purpose, reversed the
judgment and remanded the cause for further proceedings, to which
defendant excepted. Defendant did not proceed in error to the
Supreme Court, but filed his answer in the court of common pleas,
without pleading the want of jurisdiction of his person in that answer.8

Upon trial, judgment was rendered against the defendant. Thereupon,
he appealed the judgment to the circuit court and, after trial in that
court, judgment was again taken against him. He then took a petition
in error to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed, saying:
[W]e are clear in the opinion that by his appeal to the cir-

cuit court, he waived the question of jurisdiction of his person,

and entered his appearance in that court, and that court having

thus acquired jurisdiction of his person, and also of the subject matter, there was no error in rendering judgment against
him. (Emphasis added.) If he had filed a petition in error in
the circuit court, to reverse the judgment of the court of
common pleas, he would not thereby have entered his appearance in the original action, and might have obtained a ruling
upon the question as to the right of the court of common
pleas to render judgment against him ....

9

Thus, it is quite clear that the defendant's failure to reserve his
objection to jurisdiction in his answer, or otherwise raise that issue
in the answer, had no effect on the question of the trial court's
jurisdiction over him. Rather, it was the taking of an appeal as
opposed to a proceeding in error that cured the jurisdictional flaw.
Indeed, from the enactment of the Code in 1853 until the decision in Clippinger v. Sturgeon1 ° in 1915, neither case nor text makes
any mention of the need to preserve an objection to in personam
jurisdiction." All that is required of a litigant is that he raise the
question by special appearance at his first opportunity to do so, and
if the ruling is adverse to him, that he take an exception to the ruling.

15
11

(Continued from preceding page)
If the motion was based on an alleged want of jurisdiction, it would
be no such appearance or waiver; and if the motion had been erroneously
determined against the defendants in the judgment, they might have taken
their exceptions, and reversed the ruling of the court.
63 Ohio St. 169, 58 N.E. 66 (1900).
Id. at 170, 58 N.E. at 66.
63 Ohio St. 169, 171-72, 58 N.E. 66, 66. To the same effect with respect to merely
filing a notice of appeal, but not taking the appeal: Fee v. Big Sand Iron Co., 13
Ohio St. 563 (1862). This latter decision was much criticized. Nash says of it: "I
do not believe this case to be law," and "The decision, so far as I have heard it
mentioned, has not satisfied the profession." 1 S. NASH, supra, note 2, 87-8.
5 Ohio App. 233 (1915).
It might be argued that Schaeffer v. Waldo, Barry & Co., 7 Ohio St. 309 (1857) is
contra, since the court noted that "defendants waived the objection to service on the
return day, and return of the summons, by filing their answer." However, defendants
made a motion to dismiss for want of security before they made their motion to
quash, and the ease has always been treated as one in which the objection to jurisdiction was not raised at the first opportunity by special appearance solely for that
purpose. Russell v. Drake, 164 Ohio St. 520, 522, 132 N.E.2d 467, 468 (1956);
Long v. Newhouse, 57 Ohio St. 34.8, 370, 49 N.E. 79, 81 (1897) ; and O'Neal v.
Blessing, 34 Ohio St. 33, 37 (1877).
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But Clippinger v. Sturgeon worked an abrupt change in the law.
At his earliest opportunity, defendant Saffel made a special appearance in the case by motion to set aside the summons served on him.
The motion was overruled, and Saffel took his exception. After taking leave to plead, he filed an answer in which he "neither directly
nor indirectly made or set up any defense as to the jurisdiction of the court, or in any way questioned or challenged
the same." 12 During the trial (and after his co-defendant had been
dismissed) Saffel moved for dismissal on the grounds that no evidence
had been offered as to his liability, and the court had neither jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action nor of his person. The
trial court sustained the motion, and the plaintiff prosecuted error
to the Court of Appeals. That court reversed and remanded, saying:
But how stands the issue as between plaintiff and defendant E. G. Saffel? Summons was issued and served on him
in Columbiana County, where he resides. He filed a motion
attacking the jurisdiction of the court, which was heard and
overruled. He then requested and was granted leave to file
an answer, and did so. He pleaded two defenses in his answer,
but in no way challenged the jurisdiction of the court, and
thereby voluntarily entered his appearance and consented to the

jurisdiction of the court over the subject-matter of the action
and also over his person. (Emphasis added).
The cause came on for trial, and he appeared and participated in the proceedings, or at least was there by counsel.
He embraced the first opportunity to challenge the jurisdiction of the court when he filed the motion to quash the service and return of summons, but there he stopped and did not
continue to avail himself of this defense after the motion to
quash was overruled by the court. He asked for and was given
leave to plead, and filed his answer to the amended petition;
and again failed to take advantage of the opportunity presented to attack the jurisdiction of the court. He then appeared in the trial of the case.
If a party wishes to insist upon the objection that he is
not in court he must keep out for all purposes except to make
that objection. But defendant Saffel did not do this, but by
his own acts placed himself within the jurisdiction of the
court, and is now in no position to complain. 13
Here, apparently, the focus shifts from preserving the question
of jurisdiction for review, to preserving the special appearance
initially made in the action. By some magic that is not quite clear,
a continuing objection to jurisdiction prevents further participation
in the action from becoming a general appearance, while its absence
converts that participation into a general appearance. What brought
about this change?
In part, one might speculate. First of all, a contemporary text
writer made the following unsupported statement:
12 5 Ohio App. 233, 234 (1915).
1s Id. at 235-36.
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When a defendant invokes the action of the court, without questioning its jurisdiction, he thereby enters an appearance and submits to its jurisdiction of his person. And this
he may do so long as the case is pending-that is, during the
which any further procedural act may be done
time within
14
therein.
This remark is not free from ambiguity, but it could be used to support the result reached by the Court of Appeals. Secondly, several
jurisdictions had already established the rule that the objecting
party must preserve his objection in all subsequent steps of the case
if he wishes to avail himself of the point on appeal. 15 Thus, these
cases treat the reservation of the objection as something akin to a
continuing exception. But that does not seem to be the point of
Clippinger. Clippinger does not so much treat the absence of the reservation as a waiver of the exception as it does an entry of general
appearance which, as a by-product, and ex necessitate, produces a
waiver of the objection to jurisdiction.
In any case, there is no hint in the Clippinger decision that the
court was influenced by either of these developments. Rather, the
decision is expressly based on three prior Supreme Court decisions:
Allen v. Miller,16 Mason v. Alexander,17 and Long v. Newhouse.18 .

Allen v. Miller involved an attempt to obtain jurisdiction over an
out-of-county defendant by joining him with an in-county defendant.19 The out-of-county defendant, Miller, answered to the merits
and, as part of that answer, objected to the court's jurisdiction of
his person. He subsequently moved for dismissal for want of jurisdiction, and the motion was granted. Plaintiff filed his petition in
error with the district court, but it was reserved to the Supreme
Court. That court affirmed on the ground that the defendants were
not properly joined, and the case was not properly venued in the
county in which it was brought. In passing, the court said:
The defendant, Miller, embraced the first occasion which
offered, to-wit: in his answer, to assert his objection to the
jurisdiction of the court, nor did he waive that objection by any
14 G. PHILLIPS, AN

EXPOSITION

OF THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING UNDER

THE CODES

OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE 495 § 464 (1896).

15 The cases are collected in Annot., 16 L.R.A.(n.s.) 177, 182 (1908). The rule is a
minority one. As it is said in 2 R.C.L. Appearances § 21 (1914):
If, however, the defendant has duly preserved his exception a requirement that he should continue in all subsequent steps to object to that jurisdiction would seem to serve no useful purpose. It is extremely technical,
and cannot be said to prevail generally; and as a rule the cases in the
jurisdictions which hold that the general appearance is not a waiver of
the objections to the jurisdiction over the person do not speak of any

necessity, after exception has been taken, to continue to object uselessly.
10 11 Ohio St. 374 (1860).
1? 44 Ohio St. 318, 7 N.E. 435 (1886).
18 57 Ohio St. 348, 49 N.E. 79 (1897).
19 The, classical Dunn v. Hazlett situation described in note 3, supra.
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subsequent act on his part, as the defendant did in Evans v. les,

7 Ohio St. Rep. 233.20 (Emphasis added).
The in-county-out-of-county situation was also the genesis for
Mason v. Alexander. The procedural steps were complex, but they
may be fairly simplified as follows: The out-of-county defendants
filed an answer in the action which went solely to the question of
jurisdiction. Plaintiff demurred to this answer, and the demurrer
was sustained. Defendants excepted, took leave to answer, and
answered to the merits. A trial was had, and judgment rendered
against the defendants. From this judgment they appealed to the
district court. There, they moved to dismiss for want of subject
matter jurisdiction. When this was overruled, the defendants consented to trial on the merits, and it was during this trial that they
raised the question of jurisdiction of their persons. This question
was decided adversely to them, and judgment was taken against
them. They then proceeded in error to the Supreme Court. The question there argued was whether the district court had had in personam
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found that it did, principally on
the ground that the defendants themselves invoked its jurisdiction
by appealing. Thus, the court followed Fee v. Big Sand Iron Co. 2 1 But
it also made the following remark:
Allen v. Miller, 11 Ohio St. 374, is to the effect that where a
defendant, in connection with a plea to the merits, interposes
a plea to the jurisdiction as to his person, and that being first
heard and decided adversely, then proceeds with the trial
is not thereby prevented from averring want of jurisdiction.
At first blush this case might seem to be inconsistent with
the holding in the later case [Fee v. Big Sand Iton Co.], though

the opinions are rendered by the same judge. But a reference
to the language of the opinion, page 379, would appear to
relieve it of seeming inconsistency. It is that "the defendant,
Miller, embraced the first occasion which offered, to wit, in
his answer, to assert his objection to the jurisdiction of the
court, nor did22 he waive that objection by any subsequent act
on his part".
Again, Long v. Newhouse involves an out-of-county defendant
joined with an in-county defendant for the purpose of obtaining
jurisdiction over him. But here, the out-of-county defendants filed
several motions with the trial court before raising an objection to
in personam jurisdiction in the first defense of their answer. Clearly,
20 11 Ohio St. 374, 379; Evans v. Ilse, 7 Ohio St. 233 (1857) involved the filing of a
demurrer to the petition before a previously filed motion attacking in personam
jurisdiction had been ruled upon. The filing of the demurrer was held to be the
entry of a general appearance and the abandonment of the attack on jurisdiction.
21 13 Ohio St. 563 (1862). See, note 9, supra, for a comment on this case.
22 44 Ohio St. 318, 329, 7 N.E. 435, 439-40 (1886). Later, on the same page, the
Court put the quoted matter in context by saying:
Allen v. Miller seems to rest upon the effect of making objection to
the jurisdiction at the first opportunity. The present case is one where the
defendant did not make objection to the jurisdiction at the first opportunity;
but they appeared first and objected afterward. (Emphasis in the original.)
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they failed to avail themselves of the first opportunity to raise the
question, and thus waived it; and the Supreme Court so held. But
in doing so, it said:
The decisions of this court on the subject, are all to the
effect, that any step taken in a case by a defendant, other
than to object to the court's jurisdiction over his person,
enters his general appearance to the action, and he cannot
afterwards claim that the court's
23 jurisdiction of his person
has not been properly obtained.
From the context of this case, and from the examples cited by
24
the court immediately after the above quote, it is apparent that
the words "any step taken in a case" refer to steps taken prior to
raising the question of in personarn jurisdiction. And, of course, that
is the gist of all three cases: all hold that the defendant must raise
the jurisdictional question at his first opporunity to do so, and that
if he precedes it by any other "step", he has entered his general
appearance and waived the jurisdictional point. Allen v. Miller suggests and Mason v. Alexander holds, that the objection once raised
may be lost by some subsequent step, but none of the cases hold, or
even suggest, that the objection, once made, need be reiterated in
all subsequent steps if an appropriate exception is taken to the
overruling of the objection. But even had there been such hint or
holding, it would have been overruled-by implication if not by expression-by the later decision in Foster v. Borne.
Nevertheless, the Clippinger court completely ignored the decision
in Foster v. Borne, and, specifically referring to the three passages
quoted above, concluded that the defendant's failure to preserve
his objection to jurisdiction amounted to a general appearance and
a waiver of the objection. If the passages are taken out of context,
a case can be made for the conclusion. Thus, even if the defendant
23 57 Ohio St. 348, 370, 49 N.E. 79, 81 (1897). Here, before filing their answer,
defendants (1) moved for leave to plead, (2) moved to compel the plaintiff to
attach to his petition an account of the items of his claim, (3) moved for leave
to plead again, (4) moved to require the plaintiff to separately state and number,
and (5) moved to strike certain averments from the petition. As the court said:
Manifestly they could not do this [raise the question of the court's jurisdiction over their persons] after the numerous instances in which they had
submitted themselves to its jurisdiction by invoking its judgment on the
legal completeness as well as the sufficiency of the plaintiff's petition.
24 To contine the quote:
Thus a motion for leave to answer, Brundage v. Biggs, 25 Ohio St.
652; a motion to strike papers from the files, Maholm v. Marshall, 29 Ohio
St. 611; a demurrer to a petition, 1 Ohio St. 286; and, though subsequently
withdrawn, Evans v. lies, 7 Ohio St. 258; a motion to dismiss for want
of security for costs, Schaeffer v. Waldo, 7 Ohio St. 309; a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action, Handy
v. Ins. Co., 37 Ohio St. 366; Smith v. Hoover, 39 Ohio St. 249; and a
motion to strike from the petition certain averments, Railroad Co. v. Morey,
47 Ohio St. 207, 210, have all been held to enter the party's appearance
to the action, as completely as if he had been properly served with process.
In all of these cases, the motion was either filed prior to the attack on jurisdiction,
or the attack on jurisdiction was made part of the motion. In this latter case, the
attack on jurisdiction would not be by special appearance for that purpose only.
State v. Fremont Lodge of Loyal Order of Moose, 151 Ohio St. 19, 84 N.E.2d 498
(1949).
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properly raises the question of jurisdiction, he can waive it by a
subsequent act on his part (Allen v. Miller and Mason v. Alexander).

And, if he takes any other step other than to object to the jurisdiction, he enters a general appearance to the action (Long v. Newhouse).
Therefore, to avoid waiving the objection by some subsequent act or
step in the proceedings, he must preface that act or step with a
reservation of his objection to the court's jurisdiction of his person.
But when these three passages are read in context, it is clear
that the Stark County Court of Appeals decision in Clippinger is erroneous. And it is this skeleton of error upon which is stretched the
fabric of the law. One court took a wrong turning in the road, and
all other courts have since followed.
The subsequent history of what might aptly be called the Clippinger doctrine is both interesting and confusing. The question again
reached the Supreme Court of Ohio some seven years after Clippinger
in the case of Ohio Electric Railway Co. v. The United States Express

Co.25 Never was there such a pleading nightmare! Plaintiff filed its
petition, to which defendant made answer and counterclaim. Thereafter, defendant left the state, and was beyond the reach of process.
Plaintiff then filed an amended petition which stated a different
cause of action than that alleged in the original petition. No new
service was had or attempted on defendant, and defendant appeared
specially and moved to have the amended petition stricken from the
files. The motion was granted, but leave was given plaintiff to file
a second amended petition. The trial court's journal entry noted that
defendant excepted to such leave being granted. The second amended
petition was filed, and again, no new service was had or attempted
on defendant. To this the defendant filed an answer in which it expressly reserved the objection it had raised by motion, and in which
it incorporated by reference all the averments and denials of its
original answer and counterclaim, less a prayer for affirmative relief
on the counterclaim. Judgment was for the plaintiff, and defendant
proceeded in error to the Court of Appeals. One of the grounds of
error was the granting of leave to file the second amended petition.
Plaintiff argued that this ground had been waived when defendant
answered to the merits. The Court of Appeals found for the defendant on this ground, and the plaintiff filed his petition of error in
the Supreme Court. The decision of the Supreme Court on this issue
is found in paragraph 3 of the syllabus, and reads as follows:
A defendant appearing only for the purpose of objecting
to the jurisdiction, upon the overruling of such objection is
not bound to rely at his peril solely upon his exception
thereto, but may make full defense without waiving such objec-

tion. (Emphasis added).
25 105 Ohio St. 331, 137 N.E. 1 (1922).
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But what does this mean? Does it mean that he may proceed to
a defense on the merits without reserving his objection to jurisdiction, as in Foster v. Borne, or do the words "without waiving" imply
the need for some affirmative action as in Clippinger v. Sturgeon!
Ordinarily, the phrase "may make full defense without waiving"
would imply that the defendant had done all that he need do, and
no further affirmative action was required of him. But in the case
itself defendant did reserve its objection in its second answer. Thus,
in the context of the case, the phrase could mean that a "full defense"
includes a reservation of the objection to jurisdiction. But again, it
would be more logical to assume that the words "full defense"
mean more than just a defense to the question of jurisdiction, rather
than a defense which includes a reservation of the objection to jurisdiction. As the King of Siam said, "It is a puzzlement". The case
can be read as one affirming the rule of Foster v. Borne, or as one
affirming the Clippinger doctrine. And it has been read both ways.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana, for example, thought that the
above-quoted paragraph of the syllabus did away with the need for
preserving an objection to jurisdiction. The case 26 arose out of a suit
on a judgment rendered by the Court of Common Pleas for Cuyahoga
County. The defendant attacked the judgment as having been
rendered by a court without jurisdiction of his person; the plaintiff
attempted to support the judgment by arguing that defendant waived
the question of jurisdiction by moving for a new trial without specific-

ally reserving his objection to jurisdiction (which he had very carefully reserved, in all previous steps in the case). After commenting
on several Ohio cases the Court quoted paragraph 3 of the Ohio
Electric syllabus, and said:
is against
Our conclusion is that the Ohio jurisprudence
27
the contention of the plaintiffs in this case.
28 Snyder v. Davidson, 172 La. 274, 154 So. 89 (1931).
27 134 So. 89, 93 (1931). Perhaps the principle reason for the decision is that the defendant was a Louisiana resident and the view of the Ohio law being urged by the
plaintiff was not only highly technical but also in conflict with the law of Louisiana.
As the court noted (134 So. 89, 91):
The rule established by the Supreme Court of the United States, and
the rule in this state, and, as far as we are aware, the universal rule,
is that * * * [i]f the defendant, being sued in a court that has not jurisdiction ratione personae, excepts to the jurisdiction when he first appears
in the suit, and urges the exception before making any other defense, and
if the exception is overruled, he is not compelled to allow judgment to go
against him by default, but may thereafter resort to any other appropriate
means of defense, without reiterating his protest against the jurisdiction
of the court, and without thereby creating a presumption that he has abandoned his exception to the jurisdiction of the court. When a judge has erroneously overruled an exception to his jurisdiction, there is no good reason
why the exceptor should continue to remind the judge of his error at every
stage of the proceedings, in order to avoid a presumption that he (the
exceptor) acquiesces in the erroneous ruling.
Clearly, the Louisiana Supreme Court is thinking in terms of preserving the question
of jurisdicition for review. But the Clippinger doctrine had abandoned this viewpoint, and saw the problem as one involving the special appearance-general appear(Continued on next page)
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On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County
looked to the language in the opinion from which paragraph 3 of the
Ohio Electric syllabus was taken, and concluded that that language
mandated a reservation of the objection to in personam jurisdiction in
all subsequent stages of the proceeding.28
But this latter decision worked another subtle change in the
Ohio law. The Clippinger doctrine held that the failure to preserve
the objection amounted to a general appearance. This doctrine was
accepted and followed by the Court of Appeals for Williams County in
Riegel v. State, ex rel. Weaver.29 Now, the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County is speaking in terms of preserving the question of
jurisdiction for review, rather than in terms of entry of general
(Continued from preceding page)
ance dichotomy. Interestingly enough, the Clipfinger decision was one of the Ohio
decisions reviewed and distinguished by the Louisiana court. Thus, at page 93:
It is sufficient, however, to say that the decision in Clippinger v.
Sturgeon et a]. was not rendered by the Supreme Court of Ohio, and cannot
be reconciled with the decision rendered by that court in Bucurenciu v.
Ramba et al., 117 Ohio St. 546, 159 N.E. 565, 566, decided in December,
1927.
Whether Bucurenciu does conflict with Clippinger is, at best, arguable. Bucurenciu
was one of those in-county--out-of-county situations, and the out-of-county defendant
went on trial after filing a general denial to the petition. Relying upon Dunn v.
Hazlett, 4- Ohio St. 435 (1M4), the Supreme Court held that the general denial was
sufficient to raise the question of in personam jurisdiction at the defendant's earliest
opportunity, and that he was free thereafter to defend on the merits. However, in
paragraph I of the syllabus the court did note that the general denial (which, in
the circumstances of the case, amounted to an objection to jurisdiction) "saves an
exception to the jurisdiction." This at least, would indicate that the Supreme Court
is still thinking in terms of preserving the question of jurisdiction for review, and
has not adopted the Clip pinger doctrine. But given the facts of Bucurenciu, there
was no opportunity for the application of the Clippinger doctrine, so the conclusion
remains speculative.
28 Peerless Corp. v. Taylor, 52 Ohio App. 548, 550, 4 N.E.2d 168, 169 (1936). Here,
defendant corporation raised the question by motion to quash. The trial court sustained the motion, but this ruling was reversed on error proceedings. Defendant corporation then answered, and reserved its objection to jurisdiction in its answer.
Judgment was for plaintiff, and defendant corporation proceeded in error to the
court of appeals. That court said:
The question of the correctness of the ruling upon the jurisdiction of the
court is now for a second time presented to the Court of Appeals. That such
question may still be presented, after answer of the corporation reserving
such question, is approved in Ohio Electric Ry v. U.S. Express Co., 105 Ohio
St., 331, 137 N.E. 1. The court, at page 345 of the opinion says:
"A defendant having made timely objection to the jurisdiction of the
court, upon the overruling of such objection is n6t bound to rely upon his
exception thereto at his peril, but may make full defense without waiving
such objection."
This is quoted at length here because the language of the opinion differs slightly
from the language of paragraph 3 of the syllabus. The difference, however, is not
material and, in any case, the language of the syllabus is the law of the case. Cassidy
v. Glossip, 12 Ohio St. 2d 17, 231 N.E.2d 64 (1967). But in neither the language of
the opinion nor in the syllabus does the Supreme Court mandate a reservation of
the exception to jurisdiction.
29 20 Ohio App. 1, 4, 151 N.E. 784, 785 (1926). The court said:
[Defendant] filed a motion to make more definite and certain, an
answer, and a demurrer on the same day that he filed his motion to quash
service [but after the motion was overruled] without making any protest
that the court had no jurisdiction of his person, except in the motion last
referred to. Under the rule laid down in Clippinger v. Sturgeon, 5 Ohio
App. 233, he therefore entered his appearance.
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appearance. In Angus v. The Cincinnati Morris Plan Bank3 ° the Court
of Appeals for Hamilton County appeared to agree with the Cuyahoga
County Court of Appeals, but did so in such a fashion as to confuse
31
and merge the two ideas.
Whether or not this was a real deviation from the Clippinger
doctrine is of no great moment, for the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga
County returned to (or adhered to, if you prefer) the Clippinger doc32
trine in Barrett v. Black.
The cases above discussed take the question down to the year
1951, and the real mystery is why none of them discuss the application of Foster v. Borne. It is as if that case had never been decided.
For all practical purposes, it lay dormant until 1951, when it was
used to justify the decision in Blissenbach v. Yanko. 331t did not again
come to the attention of the Supreme Court until 1955, when it was
34
discussed in State, ex rel. Rhodes v. Solether.
This case put the question squarely to the Supreme Court. Relators-state officials-had been sued in Wood County. They moved
to quash service of summons. When Judge Solether indicated that
he would overrule their motion, they filed a petition for a writ of
prohibition against him in the Supreme Court. The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state a cause
so 56 Ohio App. 444, 10 N.E.2d 1019 (1937).
31 56 Ohio App. 444, 445, 10 N.E.2d 1019, 1020

(1937). The court said:

Later, however, appellant answered and failed to reserve in its answer
the complaint as to no service. Appellant thereby entered its appearance,
and cannot now, having failed to reserve the question of process in its
answer, raise the question. Peerless Corporation v. Taylor, 52 Ohio App.
548, 4 N.E.2d 168.
However, paragraph 1 of the syllabus makes no mention of the entry of appearance.
It states:
[D]efendant who, after filing a motion to strike the amended bill for

the reason no summons was issued thereon, answers but fails to reserve

therein the complaint as to no service, will not be heard to raise the question
on appeal.
But with respect to the courts of appeals, it is the opinion that is controlling, not
32

the syllabus. Carruthers v. Kennedy, 121 Ohio St. 8, 166 N.E. 801 (1929) ; Parkview
Hospital v. Hospital Service Ass'n., 8 Ohio App.2d 315, 222 N.E.2d 314 (1966).
66 Ohio L. Abs. 195, 197-98, 119 N.E.2d 306, 308 (1951). To quote Judge Skeel:
But clearly the defendant's

subsequent conduct in seeking extensions

of time to plead after such motion had been erroneously overruled and
finally pleading to the general issue [but with a reservation of his objection
to jurisdiction in the answer], constituted an entry of appearance by
defendant and a submission of the defendant to the jurisdiction of the
court.
In another three years and two months, Judge Skeel will repudiate these words,
but for the moment, they establish that the failure to preserve the objection to
jurisdiction in a motion for leave to plead made after the motion to quash has been
overruled is an entry of general appearance.
33 90 Ohio App. 557, 560, 107 N.E.2d 409-10 (1951).

34

The Court of Appeals for Mahon-

ing County cited it as authority for the proposition that taking an appeal after an
attack on jurisdiction and a defense on the merits is an entry of appearance which
waives the jurisdictional question. In view of the change in the appellate procedure
which eliminated proceedings in error, the court was quite wrong. For details of the
change in appellate procedure, see 116 LAWS OF OHIO 104 (1935).
162 Ohio St. 559, 124 N.E.2d 411 (1955).
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of action. Relators argued that prohibition was the only means available to them for testing the jurisdiction of the Wood County court
because (1) if they answer to the merits after their motion to quash
is overruled they will have entered their appearance and will have
waived their objection, or (2) if they appeal under the new appellate
procedure, their appeal will amount to an entry of appearance and
a waiver of their objection. For this second point relators cited
Foster v. Borne.

Technically, relators may have been asking for a writ of prohibition, but in substance, they were asking the court to advise them
as to the proper procedure for preserving their objection to jurisdiction. With respect to the first point, the court's advice was trenchant.
It simply stated that relators' "fears were unfounded", and quoted
the third paragraph of the Ohio Electric syllabus.3 5
With respect to the second point, the court discussed the facts
of the Foster case, and noted, as it did so, that in that case defendants
"filed their answers in the Court of Common Pleas, without pleading
want of jurisdiction of their persons",36 but it was not this, but the
taking of the appeal, that worked the entry of appearance. It then
went on to hold that the change in the appellate procedure had
made the Foster case inapplicable since there is now only an appeal
rather than an appeal and a proceeding in error. The Court said:
We hold, as was held in the Ohio Electric Ry. case, that if
a defendant, at the first opportunity after an action has been
instituted against him, appears only for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court either as to subject
matter or person, he is not, upon the overruling of such objection, bound to rely at his peril solely upon his exception
thereto but he may make a full defense in the action without
waiving his objection as to jurisdiction, either in the
37 trial
court, the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court.
Paragraph 2 of the syllabus of the case repeats the above language
less the reference to the Ohio Electric case.
But as an advisory opinion, this was less than a happy one. For
one thing, the reference to relying upon an exception is out of place.
The 1935 amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure 3" had eliminated the need for taking an exception in cases such as this. Secondly,
in quoting the language of the Ohio Electric case, the court reaffirmed
the ambiguity inherent in that decision, and did nothing to dispel it.
And this leads directly to the third point. In Foster, the defendants
did not preserve their objections to jurisdiction in their answer
85

Id. at 563, 124 N.E.2d at 413.

36

Id. at 564, 124- N.E.2d at 4.14..

37 Id. at 566, 124 N.E.2d at 414.

38 116 LAWS OF OHio 104, at 115 (1935). At the time of the decision, this amendment
appeared as § 2321.03, Ohio Revised Code. See, note 5, supra, for a fuller discussion
of the language of the amendment.
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(and this was held not to be an entry of appearance), but in Ohio
Electric the defendant did make such a reservation. Here, the court
declares the Foster case "inapplicable to present-day situations". But
is it inapplicable in toto (which would include the question of preserving the jurisdictional point), or is it merely inapplicable with respect
to the queston of an appeal amounting to the entry of an appearance?
Presumably, it is "inapplicable" only in the latter respect, but the
point is not clearly made.
It might fairly be argued that since the court noted the question
of reservation in passing, but did not comment upon it one way or
another in its express holding, it did not consider the question material, and found no significance in the presence or absence of such
a reservation. 39 But the court must surely have been aware of the
emphasis being placed on this very point by the various courts of
appeals, and it is surprising that it did not make mention of it in
the holding even if only to discount it.
But if the court was not aware of this development in the lower
courts, it soon would be, for the case of Gibson v. Sunmmers Construction
Co. 4 0 was coming to it on appeal from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County.
Heretofore, the reported decisions from the Courts of Appeals
had held that the reservation of the objection to jurisdiction had to
be made in all subsequent steps of the proceedings, including motions.4 1 In Gibson, defendant filed a motion to make definite and certain after its motion to quash had been overruled. The motion did
not contain a reservation of the objection to jurisdiction. 42 This mo39 Some support for this view can be found in the fact that the court cited Bucurenciu
v. Ramba, 117 Ohio St. 546, 159 N.E. 565 (1927) and Glass v. McCullough Transfer
Co., 159 Ohio St. 505, 112 N.E.2d 823 (1953) as support for the proposition stated in
the third paragraph of the Ohio Electric syllabus. In neither of these cases was there
any reservation of the objection, nor any mention of the need to make one. In fairness, however, it should be noted that in neither of these cases was there much
opportunity for such a reservation, since the objection to jurisdiction was first raised
by answer rather than motion or demurrer. Nevertheless, the fact that these cases
are cited seems to indicate that the court is stressing that the raising of the objection
at the first opportunity is the act that preserves the objection for review, and not
some magic formula inserted in subsequent pleadings or motions.
45096 Ohio App. 307, 119 N.E.2d 637 (1954).
41 Motion for leave to plead: Clippinger v. Sturgeon, 5 Ohio App. 233 (1915); Barrett
v. Black, 66 Ohio L. Abs. 195, 119 N.E.2d 306 (1951). Motion to make definite and
certain: Riegel v. State, ex rel. Weaver, 20 Ohio App. 1, 151 N.E. 784 (1926).
42 From the report of the case in 96 Ohio App. 307, 119 N.E.2d 637, it does not clearly
appear that the motion was without a reservation of the jurisdictional objection. However, the text of the motion can be found at pages 3 and 4 of the Record on Appeal
to the Supreme Court of Ohio, and reads as follows:
Now comes the defendant and moves this honorable court that plaintiff's
petition be made definite and certain in the following particulars, to wit:
(1) That plaintiff state whether the work and labor performed by the
plaintiff as set forth in his petition was by virtue of a written or oral contract. If written contract, then it is requested that plaintiff attach a copy
of the same to his petition or incorporate the same in the petition.
(2) That the plaintiff set forth the times when the plaintiff furnished labor
or materials for this defendant.
(3) That the plaintiff set forth the amounts that were charged for the
labor that was furnished or materials furnished on each occasion.
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tion was granted in part, and plaintiff filed an amended petition. In
its answer to the amended petition, defendant reserved its objection
to jurisdiction. The trial court found for the plaintiff, and defendant
appealed on the question of jurisdiction. On appeal, plaintiff argued
that defendant had entered its appearance by filing the motion to
make definite and certain without reserving the objection to jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County disagreed, hold43
ing that it was enough that the question was reserved in the answer.
Plaintiff then appealed to the Supreme Court.
There, he argued, as he had in the court below, that the defendant's failure to reserve its objection to jurisdiction in its motion
was an entry of appearance. Defendant countered by arguing that
no reservation was required; that all that was required was the raising of the objection at the earliest opportunity.44 Thus, the question
of reservation was put squarely before the court.
13 96 Ohio App. 307, 308-09, 119 N.E.2d 637-38 (1954). Judge Skeel said:
The claim of the plaintiff that the defendant entered its appearance
by filing a motion to make definite and certain, after its motion to quash
had been overruled, is not well taken. Having been compelled to come
within the jurisdiction by the court's ruling on the motion to quash and
having saved the question by its answer, the record does not disclose
under those circumstances that defendant voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court, and upon the record that question is now before
this court.
Not only is this in variance with what Judge Skeel had previously said in Barret
v. Black, 66 Ohio L. Abs. 195, 119 N.E.2d 306 (1951) just three years earlier (see,
note 32, suPra), but it is also in direct conflict with the decision in Riegel v. State,
ex rel. Weaver, 20 Ohio App. 1, 151 N.E. 784. (1926) which is more fully discussed
in note 29, supra. Why this departure from previous rulings? The answer is uncertain, since Judge Skeel cited no authority for this new position, nor did he attempt
to distinguish the existing cases (including his own prior decision) to the contrary.
It was as if he were writing on a clean slate.
Ironically, Judge Skeel brought Barrett v. Black back to life in the later case
of Bennett v. Radlick, 104 Ohio App. 265, 145 N.E.2d 334 (1957). The cases are
remarkably similar. In both Bennett and Barrett the basic, underlying question was
the extent of the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Cleveland. In both, defendant initially moved to quash service and, when that motion was overruled, took
leave to plead without reserving his objection to jurisdiction in the motion. In both,
defendant reasserted his objection to jurisdiction in the answer. But in Bennett, the
answer also contained a counterclaim. It was argued that the request for affirmative
relief amounted to an entry of general appearance. On this point, Judge Skeel held
otherwise, but cited Barrett for the proposition that the Municipal Court did not
have county-wide jurisdiction in actions for money only. Were he not precluded by
his own decision in Gibson and that of the Supreme Court he might also have cited
Barrett for the proposition that defendant had made his entry of appearance in
Bennett by moving for leave to plead without reserving his objection to jurisdiction.
44 The assignment of error, as it appears in plaintiff's brief to the Supreme Court, reads
as follows:
The questions of law presented in this case involve the legal effect, as
an entry of appearance, of a filing of a pleading [sic], without reservation,
by the defendant; . . .
The questions are stated as follows:
I. Does the filing of a motion to make definite and certain, following
the overruling of a motion to quash summons, enter the defendant's appearin an action?
To this, defendant's brief replied:
The objection [to jurisdiction] over the person of the defendant was raised
at the earliest moment in this case which was all that defendant was required to do. And the court having overruled the motion to quash, the
rights and objections of the defendant were saved. See Glass v. McCullough
Transfer Co., 159 Ohio St. 505, 112 N.E.2d 823.
(Continued on next page)
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And once again, that court left the answer unclear. Citing Glass
v. McCullough Transfer Co., 45 the court said:
If the motion [to quash] is overruled, he may then plead
46
to the merits and continue to protest to the court's jurisdiction.
(Emphasis added).
At first blush, this sentence would seem to affirm that line of
authority that began with Clippinger. Unlike the previous language
used in Ohio Electric and Solether (i.e., "but may make full defense
without waiving such objection" and "he may make a full defense
in the action without waiving his objection as to jurisdiction"), this
phrase implies some further affirmative action on the part of the
defendant: a renewal of his protest to the court's jurisdiction.
But the decision really raises more questions than it answers.
First of all, the Glass case is in the Dunn-Bucurenciu line, in which the
objection to jurisdiction can be made by a general denial, or otherwise raised for the first time in the answer. In this line of cases, there
is very little, if any, opportunity to raise the issue at a further stage
of the proceedings, and none of the cases in this line requires the
defendant to do so. 47 Thus, the case is not authority for the proposition for which it is cited. It does, however, tend to support the theory
for which defendant cited it; that is, if the defendant raises the
question of jurisdiction at his earliest opportunity, that is all that
is required of him; he may thereafter proceed to defend the action
without continuing his protest, and without waiving his objection
or entering his appearance. 48 Secondly, at what step in the proceeding
must the defendant "continue to protest"? Since the Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, it can hardly be said
that he must do so in motion to make definite and certain. But what
about other motions? The court is silent; but it may fairly be concluded that the protest need not be part of motions filed sebsequent
to the overruling of the motion to quash. Then he must do so in his
50
pleadings. But in all pleadings, 49 or just in the answer? What about
(Continued from preceding page)
The Glass case does not speak defendant's piece quite as strongly as defendant would
have it do, but it, taken in conjunction with Ohio Electric, Solether, and Bucurenciu,
does give some plausibility to defendant's position.
45 159 Ohio St. 505, 112 N.E.2d 823 (1953).
4 Gibson v. Summers Construction Co., 163 Ohio St. 220, 228, 126 N.E.2d 326, 330
(1955).
47Dunn v. Hazlett, 4 Ohio St. 435 (1854); Allen v. Miller, 11 Ohio St. 374 (1860)
Drea v. Carrington, 32 Ohio St. 595 (1877) ; Mason v. Alexander, 44 Ohio St. 318, 7
N.E. 435 (1886) ; Long v. Newhouse, 57 Ohio St. 348, 49 N.E. 79 (1897) ; Bucurenciu
v. Ramba, 117 Ohio St. 546, 159 N.E. 565 (1927). This does not purport to be an
exhaustive listing of this line of cases; these are cases in this line that are most
frequently cited.
48 See, note 44, jupra.
49 At the date of this decision, § 2309.02, Ohio Revised Code, defined the pleadings in
a civil action as the petition, a demurrer to the petition, the answer and/or cross
petition, a demurrer to the answer, the reply, and a demurrer to the reply.
50 At least one court indicated that it would be sufficient to assert the reservation in
the answer. See, Bennett v. Radlick, 104- Ohio App. 265, 268, 145 N.E.2d 334, 336
(1957). But in this case, the answer was the next pleading filed. Thus of necessity,
the court said nothing about demurrers.
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opening statement, or a motion for a directed verdict, or a motion
for judgment non obstante veredicto or new trial? If continuing to
protest serves a meaningful purpose, at what stage does it serve that
purpose, and at what stage does it cease to serve? Thirdly, the italicized phrase need not be given the interpretation placed on it above.
It could be read to mean that the defendant's protest to the jurisdiction automatically continues after his motion to quash is overruled;
that a plea to the merits does not discontinue the protest, since the
two are not mutually exclusive. But this is a very strained reading,
and hardly one that comports with the words used, or the fact that
defendant did preserve his objection in his answer if not in his motion
to make definite and certain.
Yet, this latter interpretation of the court's language finds some
support in the fourth and final point: the italicized phrase does not
appear in the syllabus, and is thus not part of the law of the case. 51
Accordingly, it could be argued that if the court had intended the
reservation of the objection to jurisdiction to be an essential feature
of Ohio pleading, it would have said so in its own designation of the
law of the case. And this is especially true here, since the very point
at issue was whether such a reservation had to be made in the motion
to make definite and certain. Thus, it could be concluded, since the
court did not speak of continuing to protest in the syllabus, it did
not intend those words to go beyond what it had already said in Ohio
Electric and Solether. The phrase at issue, then, is mere dictum, and
adds nothing to the law as previously enunciated.
Perhaps, but he fact remains that the court did make the statement (albeit as dictum); that it made it in a radically different formulation than that previously used by it; and that formulation corresponds in result, if not in detail, with what the Courts of Appeals had
been saying. Therefore, it is more logical to assume that the court
intended what the phrase imports: the defendant must reserve his
objection to jurisdiction at some subsequent stage of the proceeding.
Since, in this case, he did so in the answer, it is equally logical to
assume that that is the step at which the reservation must be made.
The above construction is logical, but it is not altogether convincing. After reading all of the Supreme Court cases on point, a nagging
doubt remains as to what the Court really intended when it said
"If the motion is overruled, he may then plead to the merits and
52
continue to protest the court's jurisdiction".
Paragraph 2 of the syllabus in Gibson, supra, note 46 at 221, 121 N.E.2d 327 reads:
The filing of a motion by a defendant to make the petition definite.
and certain following the overruling of his motion to quash the service of
summons in the action does not effect the entering of the appearance of
the defendant therein.
52 Whatever th'e court may have intended, the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga
County saw the decision as an affirmation of the Clippinger doctrine. See, Bennett
v. Radlick, 104 Ohio App. 265, 145 N.E.2d 334 (1957). For the facts of this case,
(Continued on next page)
51
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That doubt is intensifed by the Supreme Court's per curiam
opinion in State, ex rel. Gregory v. Masheter.53 Relators brought a proceeding in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Harrison County.
Respondent filed a motion to quash service, which was overruled,
and respondent appealed to the Supreme Court. Relator moved to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that the order overruling the motion
to quash was not a final order. The Supreme Court granted the
motion, saying:
The motion is well taken. The order overruling the
motion to quash service of summons is not a final appealable
order as defined by Section 2505.02, Revised Code. Respondent
is not precluded by the overruling of the motion to quash
but may make a full defense in the action without waiving
ex rel. Rhodes, Aud., v.
his objection to jurisdiction. State,
54
Solether, Judge, 162 Ohio St. 559.
It is significant to note that the court not only reverts to its
prior formula in this type of case, but it completely ignores its previous decision in Gibson. Indeed, except for a misapplication of the
principle in Judge Skeel's dissent in Mayer v. Sumergrade,55 it would
seem that this aspect of the Gibson decision has died a natural death.
What, then, of the Conventional Wisdom? There is no doubt that
the Conventional Wisdom was absolutely correct as far as the various
courts of appeals were concerned. Since the Clippinger decision in
1915, all of the reported decisions of those courts emphasize the need
to preserve the objection at some further stage of the proceeding.
(Continued from preceding page)
see, note 43, supra. At 104 Ohio App. 267-68, 145 N.E.2d 336, the court cited both
Solether and Gibson, and said:

The law of Ohio now clearly recognizes the right of one who has
challenged the jurisdiction of the court over his person by a motion to
quash service of summons on the ground that service has not been lawfully made or made beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and
where such motion to quash has been overruled, to defend on the merits
without waiving his right, after judgment against him, to seek a review
on appeal of the question of the court's jurisdiction over his person
where such objection to the jurisdiction of the court is pleaded in the
answer. (Emphasis added.)
Note, however, that the court is again speaking in terms of preserving the question
for review rather than in terms of entering a general appearance.
53 3 Ohio St. 2d 43, 208 N.E.2d 926 (1965).
54 Id. 208 N.E.2d at 927.
55 111 Ohio App. 237, 248-49, 167 N.E.2d 516, 524 (1960). Judge Skeel said:
A defendant who at his first opportunity (or at any other time during
trial) challenges the jurisdiction of a trial court by demurrer, based either
on the claim that the court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter
or that it is without jurisdiction because the petition does not state a cause
of action, and where the court overrules such demurrer, does not waive
either of such claims by then pleading to the issues seeking his just or legal
rights against the claim by answer and trial of the alleged cause of action,
particularly where, as here, the defendants, as a defense, continue to assert
their claim that the petition does not state a cause of action.
The principle of Gibson hardly applies to the problems of demurrers. In any case,
under the old procedure, neither lack of subject matter jurisdiction nor failure to
state a cause of action were waived by failing to assert them at the outset, and
there never was any requirement that objections on either of these two grounds had
to be preserved in subsequent stages of the proceeding.
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It is probably true to say that the Gibson decision has modified those
decisions to the extent that those courts would now be satisfied with
a reservation in the answer, although it would be more prudent to
make it in any pleading filed after the motion to quash had been
overruled. And since the trial courts are more sensitive to the rulings
of their respective Courts of Appeals than they are to the rulings of
the Supreme Court (especially when the latter are ambiguous), the
Conventional Wisdom no doubt held true with respect to the trial
courts as well.
But the Supreme Court is another matter. At the very best,
the Supreme Court's opinions on this point have been Delphic. With
the exception of Gibson-an aberration in an otherwise clean linethe Supreme Court has never expressly required a defendant to
preserve his objection to in personam jurisdiction in pleadings or motions filed with the court after his initial objection to jurisdiction
had been overruled. And even the language in Gibson which suggests
the necessity for doing so is subject to a different interpretation.
While the court has, from time to time, noted that the defendant did
(Ohio Electric, Gibson) or did not (Foster) make such a reservation,
it has placed no emphasis whatsoever on that point. The emphasis
has always been placed on whether or not the defendant properly
raised the question of jurisdiction at his first opportunity to do so.
If this question was answered in the affirmative, he was free to
"make a full defense in the action without waiving his objection
to jurisdiction". Even the language in Gibson-"plead to the merits
and continue to protest to the court's jurisdiction"-can be read to
harmonize with the former formulation. And the language in Gibson
is dictum.
Therefore, with respect to the Supreme Court, the Conventional
Wisdom is probably wrong. But the point is debatable. Unfortunately, the judges of the debate-the trial courts and the Courts of
Appeals-have subscribed to the view of Conventional Wisdom, and
true debate is foreclosed.
Thus, the pre-Rule answer to the question posed at the beginning
of this article is: "Yes, you must preserve your objection at least in
your answer, and prudence would dictate that you preserve it in all
other pleadings and motions as well".
But what of the situation under the Rules? Here, the answer is
an unequivocal "No!"
While the pre-Rule rationale for requiring the reservation was
never entirely clear,5 6 two distinct theories can be found in the
56 As it is said in Sunderland, Preserving a Special Appearance, 9 MicH. L. REV. 396,

398-99 (1911):
But no question of law or practice has come under the writer's observa-

tion which has been passed upon by the courts with so little consideration
as this one. One would expect just the converse to be true, in view of the

(Continued on next page)
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cases. The first was premised on the idea that an objection to a

court's ruling on a question of law had to be taken by way of exception. Here, the emphasis was placed on preserving the question
for review, and the reservation of the objection to jurisdiction was
seen as a continuing exception to the court's ruling and an indication
that the defendant was going to take the matter to a higher court.
To the same effect, the failure to make the reservation was an indication that defendant had abandoned his exception, and was no
longer interested in a review of the original ruling. To the extent
that the Supreme Court can be said to have required the reservation,
it required it on the basis of this theory.
The second theory was grounded in the dichotomy between
special appearances and general appearances. The objection to
jurisdiction had to be made by a special appearance. The reservation
of that objection somehow kept that special appearance alive, and
prevented further participation in the proceedings from becoming
a general appearance. On the other hand, further participation in
the proceedings without the shield of the reservation had its natural
effect-a general appearance. It is to this theory that the courts of
appeals have subscribed, with the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga
County occasionally lapsing into the heresy of the first theory.
Neither of these theories can find any justification in the Code
of Civil Procedure. Until 1935, all that Code required was the making
of the objection and its notation by way of exception added to the
journal entry or through a bill of exceptions allowed and made part
of the record. And after 1935, not even the taking of an exception
was required (although a bill of exceptions might still be necessary
for purposes of exhibiting the error in the Court of Appeals). As
was noted earlier, these theories are simply a judicial gloss put upon
the Code; they are part of that "common law" that grew up and supplanted the statutory language of the Code; verbal accretions which
judges could not resist affixing to it.
The theories are equally unsupported by any provisions of the
Civil Rules.57 With respect to the first theory, Rule 46 clearly notes
that an exception is not necessary, at any stage or step of the case or

matter, to lay a foundation for review whenever a matter has been
(Continued from preceding page)
great importance always attaching to jurisdictional questions. But with a
few conspicuous exceptions, judicial discussions of this question are trivial
and superficial. Most of the cases which pass upon the question contain no
discussion whatever, even when the question is presented to the court for
the first time. Often the opinions cite no authorities. Frequently they purport to rest upon cases which upon inspection are found to be not at all
in point. In several states the courts have reversed themselves in the most
naive manner.
Sunderland drew the above conclusion from a survey of all the jurisdictions. It is
apparent that Ohio is simply a microcosm of the whole.
57 The discussion of the Rules is based on the text of the Rules found in WEST'S OHIo
RULES OF COURT, 1972.
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called to the attention of the court by objection, motion, or otherwise
and the court has ruled thereon. Thus, there is no room in Rule
practice for the concept of a continuing exception, and no need to
make a reservation of one's objection to jurisdiction to satisfy this
concept. The objection to jurisdiction, of course, must be raised as
provided in the Rules.
The second theory is likewise laid to rest by the Rules. Lack of
jurisdiction over the person, insufficiency of process, and insufficiency
of service of process may be presented by motion or by responsive
pleading. 58 Further, Rule 12(B) provides that no defense or objection
is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion, and Rule 12(H) provides
that these objections are waived only if they are not raised by motion
or responsive pleading. The effect of all of this is to eliminate the
special appearance; under the Rules there is only one appearancea general appearance. As the Rules Advisory Committee Staff Notes
state:
The third sentence of Rule 12 (B) makes a special appearance unnecessary, and as will be pointed out later, waivable
defenses are waived by failure to include them. This is a
striking change from previous Ohio practice. 59
Since there is no longer any distinction between a special appearance and a general appearance, there is nothing for the reservation
of the objection to jurisdiction to preserve. Accordingly, it no longer
serves any function, and is no longer required. 60 Indeed, there is
some Federal authority to the effect that if the jurisdictional question is reiterated in the answer, it will be stricken on motion.6 1
58 OHIO R. CIV. P. 12(B) (2), (4) and (5).
59 1 W. KNEPPER, OHIO CIVIL PRACTICE WITH FoRMs 80.3 § 3.06 (1970). To the same
effect see J. MCCORMACK, OHIO CIVIL RULES PRACTICE WITH FORMS 137 § 6.17 (1970),
where it said:
The basic philosophy that a party must contest jurisdiction over his
person at the earliest opportunity is not changed. The change is that
there is now no requirement of a special appearance, for the purpose of
contesting jurisdiction over the person only, which is separate from any
other procedure. * * * The trap that formerly existed under Ohio practice
has now been eliminated by eliminating the requirement of a special appearance for contesting jurisdiction over the person only.
And also 3 W. MILLIGAN, OHIO FORMS OF PLEAnING AND PRACTICE 12-18 (1971),
where it is said:
The theory of the rule is that a quick presentation of defenses is to he
encouraged and that successive motions are to be discouraged. Thus, no
defense is waived by joining it with another, the effect of which is to
destroy the reason for special appearances. See Ohio Civil Rule 12(B). A
responding party waives a defense only by failing to include it in a Rule
12 motion or in the answer. A voluntary appearance does not waive the
objection of lack of jurisdicition over the person.
90 3 W. MILLIGAN, OHIO FORMS OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE 12-41 (1971):
Reassertion in answer. The jurisdictional defense need not be reiterated
in the answer if it has been raised by motion.
61 Riss & Co. v. Association of Western Railways, 162 F.Supp. 69 (D.D.C. 1958)
Southwell v. Robertson, 27 F.Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1939); Molesphini v. Bruno, 26
F.Supp. 595 (E.D. N.Y. 1939).
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This is so because the adverse ruling on the original motion to quash
or motion to dismiss becomes the law of the case, and the matter
cannot be heard again at that judicial level. Therefore, since the
trial court would exclude all evidence or argument relating solely
to the question of jurisdiction, there would be no point in reiterating
62
the objection to jurisdiction in the answer.
As Professor Jox recently put it:
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant
cannot again raise the question of jurisdiction if he has previously done so by motion to quash, as the latter act alone
for appellate review in the event of
preserves the question
6
an adverse verdict. 3
That is also true under the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. The
day for preserving one's objection to in personam jurisdiction is over;
the rule is dead.
62 Riss & Co. v. Association of Western Railways, 162 F.Supp. 69, 72 (D.D.C. 1958).
1958).
63 Jox, Non-Resident Maolorists Service of Process Acti-Notice Requiremens- A Plea
For Realism, 33 Federal Rules Decisions 151, 212 (1964).
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